

Excerpt from Foreign Ministry File.

"IMPORTANT DECISION Re INTERNATIONAL and NATIONAL POLICIES."

The gist of plans for dealing with North China.

13 January 1936. The Army Department.

A. 1. Kimitsu (confidential) No. 8.
21 January 1936.

To Ambassador Ariyoshi in China.

From Foreign Minister HIROTA.

re dispatch of a copy of "the gist of plans for dealing with North China" which was drawn up by the Army.

We have already informed you by telegram of an outline of "the plans for dealing with North China" which was drawn up by the Army.
Attached hereto, we send you a full text of the above-mentioned plans.

Copies sent to Peiping, Tientsin, Nanking, Manchoukuo, Chang-chia-kon.

Instruction to the commander of the stationary troops in China.

"Gist of plans for dealing with North China".

13 January 1936.

Policy:

The principal objects to be borne in mind in dealing with North China area, are to assist the Chinese people in realizing a self-government in North China by themselves, and thus to let the people enjoy their lives and jobs peacefully; also to let them adjust their relations with Japan and Manchoukuo, and thus promote the mutual welfare of these three nations. In order to realize the above objects, we are determined to give support and guidance to the new political organization and thus expand and strengthen its functions.

Gist of the plans:

1. Territorially speaking, the five provinces of North China will be made the object of the above-mentioned self-government; but we must be careful not to be too eager to enlarge in self-government area; on the contrary, we should first aim at a gradual realization of self-government in the Hopeh and Chahar provinces as well as in Peiping and Tientsin cities in accordance with the points given in paragraph 2 and others of this letter, and thus, we should aim at inducing the remaining three provinces to join the two voluntarily. Our advice and guidance to the Hopeh-Chahar political council should be given

through Mr. Sung and Yuan for the time being, and self-government movements by the people should be encouraged insofar as they remain fair and just, and should make use of them in gradually realizing an actual self-government among the people of these two provinces, thus laying firmly the foundation of the self-government for the five provinces in North China.

With regard to the East Hopeh self-government, we should uphold its independence as long as the self-government function of the Hopoh-Chahar political council remains unsatisfactory, but when the self-government in the Hopeh and Chahar Provinces is established to such a degree as will generally justify our confidence in it, we should induce the East Hopeh self-government to merge into the Hopoh-Chahar political council at the earliest opportunity as possible.

2. With regard to the extent of the self-government, it would, of course, be better to let the people have as much liberty as possible, but for the present, we should aim at and endeavor for the realization of such state as will leave no room for the Nanking Government to carry out anti-Japanese and anti-Manchukuo policies, and by leaving the rest for gradual achievements in future we should avoid too hasty desire for an acquisition of independent powers.
3. With regard to the guidance to be given by us, we should endeavor principally to guide in the economic field, especially in finance, and also, in military affairs, along with the education and guidance of the general populace; and in doing so, we should confine our guidance in the general line, leaving, as much as possible, the details to the task and responsibility of the Chinese people. In this connection, we should like to call your special attention to the following points:

In giving guidances this time, we are to take no such measures as might be misunderstood (by the world) that Japan is going to set up an independent state like Manchukuo, or she is intending to carry out an expansion of Manchukuo; accordingly, appointments of Japanese advisers should be confined to various committees within the (Hopeh-Chahar) political council and to the 29th Army, and their numbers should be restricted to the smallest possible number; moreover, those personnel and material which are necessary for public utilities and exploitation of industries, etc., inclusive of advisers mentioned above, should be sought from Japan proper as far as possible. With regard to economic penetration, it should be left principally to voluntary debouchment of private capital, and should be so guided as to serve for the realization of the principle of live and let live.

4. Operations towards Inner Mongolia should, of course, be continued on the line pursued hitherto; but those measures which might become obstacles to the strengthening of self-governing power of the Hopoh-Chahar political council and an expansion of self-government in Shan-si and Sui-yuan provinces, should be held back for the time being and the southward expansion of Mongolian influence should be

kept under proper control; consequently our operations in Inner Mongolia should generally be confined to the areas north of the Great Wall of China, and should not be allowed to extend into the area belonging to East Sui-yuan and Sungang villages.

5. The management of North China would be the duty of the commander of the Japanese stationary troops in China, and as a rule, he should execute this duty by direct contact with the Ho-poh-Chahar and East Ho-poh governments: in doing so, he should aim at giving advices and guidances informally.

With regard to economic penetration, the stationary forces should not assume a leading part, but should guide it from aside. However, for the convenience of assisting the Ho-poh-Chahar political council, for the time being we are going to establish in Peiping a provisional organization which would be placed under the supervision of the commander of the Japanese stationary troops in China (concerning problems of the self-government organizations as well as of controlling advisors, etc.).

The Kwantung Army and various organizations in North China should cooperate in these operations. Besides, each military attaché in China should act in concert with these operations, especially the military attaches to the Japanese Embassy and those residing in Nanking; should try, from time to time, to convince the Nanking Government of the necessity of granting self-government to the North China area, and at the same time should try to get the approval of the Nanking Government for the six items pertaining to self-governing power for North China area, or at least, get the Nanking Government's promise that they will carry out no maneuvers which will disturb the self-government in North China.

6. In carrying out "these plans", the various military organizations mentioned above, should keep close contact with the officials of the Foreign Office and the Navy stationed in China, as and when the occasion may require.